2.1 First Incident 26/06/2025 and 04/07/2025 (NYFRS in attendance)

On 26 June 2025, reports of smoke in a remote forested area prompted North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service attendance. The location was remote and difficult to access, requiring approximately 30 minutes travel from the nearest road access point, with dense vegetation, uneven peat ground conditions and limited water availability restricting the movement of personnel and equipment. As a result, the fire proved challenging to fully extinguish, with evidence of deep seated burning within peat deposits and sustained fire spread through surrounding vegetation.

Firefighting tactics focused on the creation of engineered and natural fire breaks, including excavated tracks, drainage works, and use of the River Derwent, to contain the fire within a defined area.

Once the fire had been assessed as contained within these established control measures, a formal external handover was completed on 4 July 2025, transferring responsibility for the incident to Forestry England.

At 10:54 on 4 July 2025, the handover form was formally completed, and by 16:42 the same day it had been issued electronically to Forestry, confirming acceptance of responsibility.

The external handover process is an established NYFRS procedure used where a fire cannot be fully extinguished but is contained within control lines and can be safely managed by a responsible landowner or agency under a “watching brief.”

The handover documentation outlined that:

• the assessment at that stage was that the fire was contained within established firebreaks, alongside arrangements for continued monitoring and reassessment

• NYFRS would not remain on site and would only re-attend if:
  • the fire breached control measures, and
  • a 999 request for assistance was made

From this point (4 July 2025), NYFRS were no longer in continuous attendance at the incident, with operational responsibility formally transferred to Forestry England. Subsequent NYFRS involvement was therefore limited to reactive attendance only, in line with the agreed handover protocol and only when requested or if escalation occurred.

2.2 Subsequent Monitoring Phase (4 July – 11 August 2025)  (FRS not in attendance)

Ongoing communication between Forestry England and NYFRS ensured that the situation was continually assessed. Control logs confirm multiple contacts between NYFRS and Forestry England between 4 July and 11 August. Forestry England attended site as appropriate and provided updates to inform whether Fire and Rescue Service intervention was required.

On multiple documented occasions, NYFRS received confirmation that the site was being monitored regularly and were informed by Forestry England that NYFRS attendance was not required.

2.3 Escalation and Major Incident Declaration (11 – 14 August 2025) (NYFRS back in attendance)

In the early evening of 11 August 2025, NYFRS resources were mobilised to a separate incident within the area. Whilst en-route, crews observed visible smoke originating from the location of the previous Langdale / Fylingdales Moor fire. In line with established operational procedures and dynamic risk assessment principles, the crews informed Fire Control and requested permission to divert temporarily to investigate the smoke plume and assess whether there had been any change in conditions at the previously contained
fire ground.

On arrival at the previous fire location, crews confirmed that the fire had breached the
previously established firebreak within the forestry area, indicating that containment had
been lost. This prompt identification enabled NYFRS to rapidly escalate the response,
mobilise additional resources and re-establish firefighting operations at an early stage. The actions taken by crews and Fire Control reflected the importance of maintaining
situational awareness during periods of prolonged hot, dry and windy conditions, where wildfire behaviour can change quickly and previously contained areas can deteriorate
unexpectedly.

By 12 August, the fire had moved beyond the confines of the forest and spread into
the open moorland. The presence of large volumes of continuous vegetation fuel and
very few natural barriers meant the fire spread more quickly and covered a much larger
area.

At this point, NYFRS convened a Multi-agency Advisory Teleconference (MAAT) in
accordance with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Response to Major and Critical Incidents (RMCI) arrangements to facilitate multi-agency coordination and situational awareness.

On 13 August, despite the operational measures in place, the incident escalated as wind-driven fire behaviour increased the rate of spread. As wind conditions continued to shift, the fire was driven towards Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) at RAF Fylingdales, significantly elevating the risk profile. In response, an assistance message was sent from the on-scene Incident Commander to Fire Control, requesting resources to be increased to 20 fire appliances,supported by specialist equipment. A major incident was initially declared due to the potential risk of the fire spreading towards the CNI of RAF Fylingdales. This was developed to include the life, community, environmental and
economic risks posed by the fire. 

This facilitated a rapid scale-up of the operational response and triggered increased support from neighbouring fire and rescue services, including Cleveland, County Durham
and Darlington, Humberside and West Yorkshire. Sections 13 and 16 arrangements* 
had been in place from the outset of the incident, allowing fire and rescue services to
provide mutual assistance and shared support during emergencies; however, at this stage the escalation of the incident required a significantly greater draw on these resources. This enabled neighbouring appliances to be mobilised both to the incident ground to support firefighting.

As fire crews tackled the fire, an explosion was witnessed on scene from a military device
buried in the moorland which had ‘cooked off’ and exploded on the incident ground, leading the Incident Commander to withdraw crews from high-risk areas of the moorland and revert to defensive firefighting tactics. A multi-agency meeting was held on scene, bringing together key agencies to understand this risk. During the meeting, a second UXO cooked off. The Incident Commander requested the attendance of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to attend scene**. It was confirmed that the explosions were caused by buried munitions, reflecting the site’s historic use as a Ministry of Defence training range. Archived records were unable to provide sufficient detail to identify the precise locations where munitions may be present across the moorland***.

Because of this a defensive risk assessment approach was required for containing and
extinguishing the fire****. From this point, standard, trained methods of offensive moorland firefighting were significantly constrained and no longer viable due to the elevated safety risks.

Following the discovery of UXO on scene, alternate tactics were deployed to suppress
fire spread. This included the commissioning of a helicopter, initially by Forestry England, then NYFRS and the use of heavy machinery to create further surface firebreaks.
The combination of these tactics ensured that fire suppression efforts could continue
despite the significant risks posed by buried munitions. Coordination between agencies,
including Forestry England, NYFRS, and MOD EOD teams, was essential to maintain safety and operational effectiveness throughout this challenging phase of the incident.

*Sections 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 allow Fire and Rescue Services to provide mutual assistance and enter into agreements for shared support, resources and service delivery during emergencies and periods of increased demand

**JESIP Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework.
*** MOD Guidance for Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
**** NFCC National Operational Guidance (NOG) – Hazardous Materials and Explosives.

2.4 Second Incident  (14 August 2025)

Whilst NYFRS was committed to the Fylingdales Moor major incident, Fire Control received reports during the evening of 14 August 2025 of a further moorland fire to the east of the A171 near the Flask area. This was a separate and geographically distinct seat of fire, approximately three kilometres away.

The Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) meeting held on 14 August 2025 provided continued multi-agency situational awareness, coordination and information sharing. Discussions included the impact of concurrent incidents on emergency service resources and the arrangements required to maintain an effective response across both incidents.

The incident, near the Flask Inn, was attended by six NYFRS appliances, supported by officers and members of the local farming community, whose local knowledge and availability of equipment assisted the response greatly. Due to the proximity of the fire to east coast residential areas, there was a significant risk of rapid fire spread, necessitating decisive and assertive firefighting actions.

The fire was successfully extinguished through early intervention, preventing escalation and mitigating the risk to life and property. Despite the pressure on resources caused by the concurrent major incident, command, control and coordination were maintained effectively.

The cause of this fire is known to have been the careless disposal of smoking materials, most probably by a bystander who had stopped their vehicle at the roadside to observe the main incident and subsequently disposed of a cigarette in dry vegetation. This incident further emphasised the heightened wildfire risk created by extreme environmental conditions and the dangers posed by seemingly minor acts of carelessness during periods of prolonged heat and drought.

2.5 Containment and Managed Stability (15–24 August 2025)

The first Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) meeting for the incident took place on  15 August 2025.

In line with established arrangements, North Yorkshire Police chaired the first SCG, with NYFRS and Emergency Planning representatives briefing partner agencies and government representatives on the developing situation and ongoing risks. Although the overall fire area had not significantly increased since the evening of 13 August, the scale and complexity of the operational challenge remained substantial and required a sustained multi-agency response.

The SCG agreed a containment strategy focused on the use of prioritised control lines and firebreaks to limit further fire spread where appropriate. The Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) was tasked with progressing this approach, supported by a logistics cell responsible for developing options, coordinating resources and assessing practical delivery requirements. Supporting actions included the establishment of a communications cell, early recovery planning activity and continuation of helicopter support arrangements, including the transfer of existing helicopter coordination from Forestry England.

The Chief Fire Officer also engaged early with MHCLG to progress a Bellwin application, supported by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor, recognising the exceptional and prolonged nature of the incident and the associated financial impact on the Service.

At the incident ground, NYFRS maintained a sustained and significant operational response, supported by neighbouring fire and rescue services through mutual aid arrangements. Operational priorities remained focused on containing the fire, protecting life and property, and preventing escalation towards RAF Fylingdales. Helicopters and heavy machinery continued to support suppression activity and the development of control lines, while aerial operations also provided valuable situational awareness across the extensive incident ground.

To complement NYFRS’s own nationally accredited Wildfire Tactical Advisor (WTA), additional WTAs were mobilised through National Resilience arrangements. These Tactical Advisors carried out regular structured assessments of wildfire conditions and fire behaviour using SMEAC reports6, providing clear and safety-critical advice to the Incident Commander and Incident Management Team throughout the incident.

SMEAC reports between 18 and 24 August consistently assessed the fire as low intensity but high-risk due to its overall complexity. While a broad range of risks existed across the incident ground, three factors were particularly influential in shaping tactical decision-making during this phase.

The first was deep-seated peat fire, particularly towards the west and in the direction of RAF Fylingdales, where fire burning below the surface had the potential to spread unseen and re-emerge.

The second was the risk of surface fire spread across large areas of unburnt heather, particularly to the north, where there were limited natural or man-made firebreaks.

The third was the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which restricted safe access to parts of the incident ground and significantly constrained tactical options, requiring firefighting operations to be carried out from established tracks and controlled access points.

To ensure safe and effective operations, Incident Commanders applied WTA advice alongside National Operational Guidance (NOG), which emphasises proportionate and risk-based decision-making, safe access and egress, and avoiding unnecessary exposure of personnel during wildfire operations.

Forward planning during this period also considered forecast weather conditions, including the potential for a change in wind direction around 25 August. In response, operational activity was adapted to strengthen containment measures in sectors considered most vulnerable to changing fire behaviour.

Within the northern sectors, WTA assessments, supported by ground investigation, contractor testing and thermal imaging, identified relatively shallow peat conditions and limited evidence of subsurface fire spread beneath the established track network. As a result, the primary risk in these areas was assessed to be surface fire spread through unburnt heather rather than deep peat ignition.

Based on this assessment, a fuel separation strategy was adopted. Existing tracks were used as primary control lines and widened through surface fuel removal and scraping to create more substantial barriers. These measures were supported by increased firefighting resources, third-party water carriers and sustained damping operations along vulnerable sections of the control line. Continuous monitoring, including drone heat mapping and visual observation, was used to identify hotspots and support tactical decision making.

Taken together, these measures reflected a proactive and risk-informed approach aligned to WTA advice, National Operational Guidance and forecast weather conditions. As a result, the fire remained contained within the same overall area between 13 and 24 August.

2.6 Escalation – Wind-Driven Fire Behaviour (25 August 2025)

Over the Bank Holiday weekend, on the 25 August, a significant change in wind direction and wind strength led to a rapid escalation in fire behaviour. The potential for deteriorating conditions had previously been identified through TCG and SCG processes, resulting in additional resources and reinforcement activity being deployed in advance. This included the use of Argocats, 4×4 wildfire vehicles and Land Rovers for tactical suppression, alongside daily drone heat mapping to identify hotspots and support targeted intervention activity. Due to the ongoing UXO risk, firefighting operations remained restricted to established track access only.

Areas of moorland that had shown little or no visible flame activity for over 10 days were reignited by extreme wind conditions, resulting in a rapidly developing flame front to the north of the incident ground. Despite strengthened containment measures, the fire displayed extreme and uncharacteristic behaviour, including intense ember transfer and fire tornados, with embers travelling a significant distance beyond the established control line. This exceeded the planning assumptions of experienced WTAs and operational commanders.

The northern control line had been established based on WTA assessments that identified surface fire spread as the primary risk in this area, rather than deep peat fire spread beneath the control line. The control strategy therefore focused on fuel separation, widening existing tracks, sustained damping operations and continuous monitoring. These measures had remained effective for approximately 10 days prior to the escalation.

However, the combination of extreme wind conditions, dry fuels and continuous heather allowed the fire to breach the control line through wind-driven ember transfer into unburnt vegetation beyond the break. This represented a significant turning point in the incident, escalating it from a large but locally managed wildfire into an incident of unprecedented scale and complexity.

Once the fire breached the control line, it entered a large area of continuous moorland fuel, with very limited natural or man-made barriers. The absence of effective breaks allowed the fire to spread rapidly under the prevailing wind conditions.

Further resources were prioritised to the breach in an attempt to contain the fire. However, the speed and intensity of fire spread, combined with UXO-related access restrictions, meant crews could no longer safely operate directly against the advancing fire edge in some areas. To maintain firefighter safety, resources were repositioned several kilometres ahead of the fire to more defensible locations, where operations could be re-established in front of the projected fire spread.

Crews worked to identify and utilise available landscape features, ultimately using the B1416 corridor as a stronger and more defensible control line to limit further progression of the fire.

2.7 Peak Response Phase (26 – 30 August 2025)

This period marked the peak of the incident, with a significant increase in both the scale and complexity of the response. Large number of fire appliances and specialist wildfire resources continued to be deployed, supported by National Resilience assets and assistance from other fire and rescue services.

National Resilience support was primarily requested to provide relief and recuperation for NYFRS crews. Given the duration and intensity of the incident, this enabled local crews to rest and recover, helping to maintain safe and sustainable operations over a prolonged period, while also supporting stability in local fire cover.

The request for National Resilience assets required significant planning and engagement. As well as allowing other Fire and Rescue Services the time to seek volunteers and assess their ability to release assets for a number of days, there was significant logistical planning required to facilitate a National Resilience deployment. This included sourcing a suitable location for the Strategic Holding Area (SHA). This pre-planning commenced on the 25th

August and the formal request was made on 26th August once all the logistics had been completed and the Pickering Showground location secured.

During this time, the fire spread quickly to the north, increasing the size of the incident and requiring earlier plans and assumptions to be reviewed.

The extreme intensity of the fire was clearly demonstrated when it reached the B1416. This public highway comprises a solid, engineered tarmac surface approximately six metres wide, with a constructed depth of over half a metre, forming a substantial non combustible subsurface barrier.

Roadside verges further reduced the available fuel load, extending the effective fire break to almost nine metres in width, although in places vegetation had encroached into what would otherwise be a sterile zone. Despite these features, and under the prevailing conditions, the fire was able to breach the corridor.

This behaviour illustrates the severity of the fire intensity, particularly the influence of strong winds transporting heat and embers across a barrier that would ordinarily be expected to impede fire spread. This context is important when considering the effectiveness of control measures. Where a barrier of this scale and construction proved insufficient, it indicates that trenching alone, especially of lesser width and depth, would not have been effective in isolation.

In response to the escalating risk, operational tactics were reviewed and adapted through close coordination with partner agencies. Control measures were strengthened; resources were re allocated to priority risk areas and clear, pre-agreed thresholds were established for any precautionary evacuation activity. These arrangements were governed through regular Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) meetings, with strategic oversight provided by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).

The response was underpinned by established multi-agency arrangements, which were expanded as the incident developed. These arrangements enabled the effective integration of partner agencies, specialist advisers, contractors and the local farming community and supported the coordination of logistics, welfare and resource deployment across a wide geographic area.

Public communication formed a critical element of the response. Communities were kept informed of developing conditions, including road closures and any potential requirement for evacuation. Communications activity was

coordinated across partner agencies to ensure consistency, accuracy and public reassurance, supporting informed decision making while avoiding unnecessary alarm during a dynamic and evolving situation.

After the escalation, the fire continued to follow the natural shape of the moorland as anticipated by Wildfire Tactical Advisors (WTAs) and local landowners.

NYFRS took a clear, risk-based approach, focusing on protecting people, communities and key infrastructure, with efforts concentrated around the A171.

This included planning for evacuations and, where required, taking precautionary action to keep the public safe. Grouse Hill Caravan Park was successfully evacuated, while the coordinated efforts of fire crews and local farmers prevented the fire from breaching the site boundary and impacting the properties. Flask Caravan Park and the Flask Inn were also evacuated as a precautionary measure to ensure the safety of residents, visitors and staff.

In addition to evacuating some buildings and businesses in the immediate risk area, the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) undertook substantial work during this period to identify vulnerable people and develop precautionary evacuation plans, despite the assessed risk of fire spreading to East Coast communities such as Whitby and Robin Hood’s Bay remaining very low.

By focusing on the areas of greatest risk, crews alongside partners were able to slow and contain the fire. Working with the landscape was key to limiting the impact of the fire and preventing more serious consequences.

2.8 Re-stabilisation Phase

The combination of sustained firefighting activity and improving environmental conditions supported a gradual transition towards stabilisation. By this stage, fire behaviour had moderated, enabling increased levels of control to be established across the incident ground.

The containment strategy implemented integrated direct firefighting activity with
targeted control measures in priority areas. This included continued damping down of active fire fronts, reinforcement of established control lines with surface fre breaks and focused intervention where residual heat and subsurface burning continued to present a risk.

Ongoing engagement at Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) ensured that resources
remained aligned to priority risks and that conditions were subject to continuous reassessment.

Strategic oversight was sustained to support decisions on resourcing and to manage the phased transition from response to recovery.

2.9 Transition to Recovery (From 5 September 2025)

As fire behaviour reduced and containment held, the incident transitioned from active firefighting into a considered recovery phase. Operational priorities centred on the identification and management of residual hotspots, particularly areas of deep seated heat within peat, which continued to present a risk of re ignition. This required sustained monitoring, damping down and coordinated working with landowners, contractors and partner agencies. The continued presence of unexploded ordnance within parts of the incident footprint further influenced how activities were undertaken and required ongoing liaison with the Ministry of Defence and specialist advisors. Major Incident status was maintained throughout this period to retain access to National Resilience assets and enable the rapid reintroduction of resources at Resources were progressively scaled back in a controlled and risk-informed manner, undertaken in coordination with farmers and land managers, with a gradual reduction in resources. This ensured that appropriate operational cover and monitoring arrangements remained in place where required, while capacity was released back into wider service delivery.

With the onset of wetter and colder conditions further reducing residual fire activity, confidence increased that active incident command arrangements were no longer required. However, Major Incident status was maintained to retain access to National Resilience assets and enable the rapid reintroduction of resources at scale if required.

Following extended monitoring and assurance activity, the incident was formally closed on  23 December 2025, when a stop message was issued, marking the conclusion of NYFRS’s command, control and coordination of the incident.

NB Whilst referenced later within this report, detailed recovery arrangements are not explicitly covered and will instead form part of the separate LRF debrief reporting.