Communications and media messaging formed a critical component of the response, particularly given the level of national media interest and the complexity of the incident. Early media dial-in sessions via Microsoft Teams were effective in managing demand, reducing the volume of individual enquiries and interview requests, and enabling a more coordinated and consistent external message during the initial stages.

The Service primarily used its website as the central platform for incident updates throughout the response. This reflects established Service practice, providing a single, accessible and authoritative source of information for both the media and the public whilst enabling chronological updates to be published quickly and efficiently as the incident evolved. Between August and December 2025, over 60 incident updates were published on the Service website, creating a comprehensive and transparent record of the response.

Social media channels, primarily Facebook and, to a lesser extent, Instagram and X, were used to support warning and informing activity, reinforce key public safety messages and provide updates on incident developments where appropriate. Between August and November 2025, the Service published more than 85 social media posts relating to the wildfire across its corporate channels. These platforms provided an effective mechanism for amplifying key messages and directing the public towards the latest information hosted on the Service website.

Several media briefings were held throughout the incident and video updates were provided. The Service website was updated daily, including a dedicated incident update page which provided a consistent reference point for both the media and the public. Media briefings were primarily conducted via Microsoft Teams, reflecting the operational risks associated with inviting journalists onto the moorland whilst the incident remained ongoing.

Briefings and updates were provided on:

• 14 August – briefing via Microsoft Teams
• 21 August – briefing via Microsoft Teams
• 27 August – multi-agency briefing (NYLRF partners) via Microsoft Teams
• 29 August – in-person media briefing at the Strategic Holding Area (followed by a video update)
• 4 September – video update
• 23 September – video update aligned to the de-escalation of Major Incident status

A structured multi-agency communications approach was established through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), including the formation of a dedicated Communications Cell and a rolling communications email chain. This provided a mechanism for communications representatives from partner organisations, including NYFRS, North Yorkshire Police, North Yorkshire Council, the York and North Yorkshire

Combined Authority, Forestry England, UKHSA, NHS and Yorkshire Ambulance Service, to share updates, coordinate messaging and amplify key public information through their respective channels. A smaller communications coordination group was also established for those organisations most directly involved in the incident, supporting timely information sharing and message alignment.

The York and North Yorkshire Combined Authority also provided communications support during periods of annual leave, helping to ensure continuity of communications activity and enabling key updates and messages to continue to be shared in a timely and coordinated manner. The Combined Authority further supported the response by amplifying Service and partner messaging through its own communication channels.

The incident highlighted the challenge of balancing public information requirements with wider expectations for frequent updates. During the early stages, operational updates were sometimes necessarily limited to confirming that the fire remained ongoing and that crews would remain in attendance for a sustained period. This reinforced the importance of setting clear expectations regarding what information could be shared, why further detail may not yet be available and how transparency and public confidence could still be maintained during a rapidly evolving incident.

Maintaining this balance was particularly challenging during a prolonged, high-profile incident where public interest, media demand and social media commentary remained significant throughout. Due to the volume of engagement generated, it was not possible to continuously monitor or respond to all comments received through social media channels. Instead, the communications approach focused on ensuring accurate and verified information was regularly published through official channels.

At times, inaccurate, incomplete or speculative information was shared externally, including by social media accounts with significant followings. This created additional challenges for public messaging and understanding and occasionally complicated efforts to maintain a consistent and authoritative narrative. The incident highlighted the value of monitoring emerging misinformation, disinformation and rumours more proactively during prolonged incidents, supported by timely operational updates that enable inaccurate information to be challenged quickly through official channels.

The incident also highlighted the importance of maintaining clear and consistent corporate messaging across all Service communication channels. At the time of the incident, a number of individual station social media accounts operated independently. Whilst well intentioned, some messages, including requests for donations, differed from agreed corporate communications and occasionally created confusion. Since the incident, the Service has transitioned to district-level Facebook accounts which are accessible to the communications team, providing greater oversight and consistency of messaging.

The response also highlighted the importance of maintaining close communication between operational commanders and communications teams where issues such as evacuations, road closures or significant changes in incident activity are being considered. This supports the timely delivery of warning and informing messages and ensures the public receives accurate and consistent information during periods of heightened uncertainty.

Overall, the communications strategy provided a strong foundation for managing substantial public and media interest throughout the incident. The learning identified presents an opportunity to further strengthen resilience, coordination and the ability to maintain a proactive narrative during prolonged and complex incidents, whilst maintaining effective warning and informing arrangements for communities affected by future major incidents.

What Worked Well

• Early use of media dial-in sessions effectively managed high levels of media demand
• Regular website and social media updates supported timely public information and warning and informing activity
• Strong multi-agency communications coordination through the LRF Communications Cell and partner communication networks
• Clear alignment of messaging across partners on key issues such as public safety, health messaging and road closures
• Effective use of multiple communication channels improved accessibility, consistency and public confidence.

Learning Opportunities

• Strengthen arrangements to monitor and respond to misinformation, disinformation and rumours
• Further improve the flow of operational information to communications teams to support timely public messaging
• Enhance communication arrangements to ensure timely and consistent updates are provided to political leaders during major incidents.